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In preparing this chapter, I initially wrote that the economics of 
hazards and disaster is a subfi eld of environmental economics. Upon re-
fl ection, I crossed that out, replacing it with “the economics of hazards 
is a subfi eld of no less than fi ve major fi elds, including behavioral eco-
nomics, fi nance, regional economics, public fi nance, and environmental 
economics.” This of course made the retrospective a bit daunting, espe-
cially for a chapter of this length. So, in looking back over the last 40 
years, I culled a few key ideas that were infl uential in shaping disaster 
research over this formative period.
When it came to providing a prospective view, I took the easy path. 
I limited my coverage to the fi eld that has absorbed my efforts over the 
past 30 years: that is, the regional and national economic consequences 
of disaster.
SOME HISTORY
The beginnings of this fi eld can be traced back as far as John Stuart 
Mill, who, I am embarrassed to admit, preempted much of what I will 
present in the second half of the paper. Nearly 150 years ago Mill re-
marked about the economics of disaster, commenting on “what has so 
often excited wonder, the great rapidity with which countries recover 
from a state of devastation; the disappearance, in a short time, of all 
traces of the mischiefs done by earthquakes, fl oods, hurricanes, and the 
ravages of war” (quoted in Hirshleifer 1987, p. 79).
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Almost a century later, John Kenneth Galbraith corroborated Mill’s 
observations. As director of the Strategic Bombing Survey, Galbraith 
investigated the impact of Allied bombing raids on the German war 
machine. The survey concluded that the raids had had little impact. 
Hamburg recovered nearly 80 percent of its productive capacity within 
several months after a series of devastating attacks. The bombing raids 
virtually decimated the city’s infrastructure, killed nearly 40,000 people 
and destroyed 50 percent of the city’s buildings (Hirshleifer 1987). De-
spite these losses, production was only modestly affected.
These early roots provide a glimpse of the fi eld’s beginnings. How-
ever, it wasn’t until the 1960s that four publications helped launch the 
fi eld: The Economics of Natural Disasters: Implications for Federal 
Policy (Dacy and Kunreuther 1969), Design of Water-Resource Sys-
tems (Maass et al. 1962), A Unifi ed National Program for Managing 
Flood Losses (U.S. Congress 1966), and “Losses from Natural Haz-
ards” (Russell 1970). Dacy and Kunreuther provided key insights into 
the economic consequences of disasters (in this case the 1964 Alaskan 
earthquake). Design of Water-Resource Systems set down the proce-
dures for conducting benefi t-cost studies of water projects. A Unifi ed 
National Program for Managing Flood Losses encouraged the adop-
tion of a wider range of fl ood mitigation measures (at least wider than 
the system of levees and reservoirs the Corps of Engineers had pro-
moted prior to that time) and introduced the idea that fl ood insurance 
might serve as a mechanism to promote an effi cient means of coping 
with fl ood hazards. The word might is emphasized since the document 
was wary about insurance, for it was pointed out that an improperly 
structured insurance program could make things worse. These three 
publications provided enough starter material to employ a (very) small 
army of economists for the next 40 years.
From what I gather, Cliff Russell’s classic “Losses from Natural 
Hazards” grew out of his association with the Harvard Water Resources 
Program and his collaboration with Bob Kates. This association was 
key since Bob Kates, Gilbert White, and Ian Burton are widely rec-
ognized as the fi eld’s pioneers. Russell’s piece served to convert the 
basics of water resource economics into the economics of hazard man-
agement. In short, he showed that protection from natural events should 
be adopted so long as the expected marginal benefi t (the loss avoided 
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due to protection) exceeded the expected marginal cost of that protec-
tion. In hindsight this is not a startling fi nding, and a direct line can be 
drawn back to Harvard, particularly the work of Arthur Maass, May-
nard M. Hufschmidt, Robert Dorfman, Harold A. Thomas Jr., Stephan 
A. Marglin, and Gordon Maskew Fair. Despite its simplicity, the idea 
proved to be a powerful reminder that hazards management involves a 
balance between costs and losses.
It could be said that Russell’s work was foreshadowed by two ear-
lier papers, one by Lester Lave (1963) and the other by Richard Nelson 
and Sidney Winter (1964). Although their work did not address haz-
ards in the way that Russell did, the framework developed served as a 
foundation for later work in managing a wide range of hazards. There 
is of course much more to the story. But a recurring theme in all these 
works is the interplay of costs and losses, either objective or perceived. 
The retrospective segment of the paper will thus focus on a few key 
ideas that grew out of this early body of work. The second part, the pro-
spective view, will concentrate on new avenues of research involving 
disaster loss. This, in my view, is perhaps the most important yet least 
understood aspect of the problem.
RETROSPECT
As indicated earlier, there is a vast body of literature to plow through 
in order to come up with a set of key ideas. Much of what I am about 
to present is based on the works of Lave (1963), Nelson and Winter 
(1964), and Howe and Cochrane (1976). All three investigate whether 
to mitigate losses from a potentially damaging event. They conclude 
(as did Russell) that the interplay of event probabilities and subsequent 
consequences shapes that choice. The framework about to be presented 
draws upon a highly stylized example, one where fl oods are of a dichot-
omous nature, and costs, losses, and event probabilities are well known. 
The presentation assesses the merits of taking action (or not) in view 
of a short-term fl ood forecast. It then entertains the possibility that it 
might be economically advantageous to adopt a more permanent fl ood 
mitigation strategy, one that is tied to the probability of fl ooding alone, 
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ignoring forecasts altogether. Finally, the framework is tweaked to ad-
dress very long-run changes in climate.
The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate the power of these 
simple models. Although not very complex, nor pathbreaking, they of-
fer policymakers valuable insights into how to value meteorological 
forecasts and even climate change research.
The Value of Forecasts
Should one heed a fl ood forecast? The answer to this question hinges
on the cost of doing something, the loss incurred if a fl ood occurs (and 
insuffi cient protection is afforded), the climatological record, and the 
accuracy of the forecast. To illustrate, let’s begin by characterizing 
fl ooding as a dichotomous event: it either occurs or it doesn’t (Figure 
4.1). Four combinations of fl ood forecasts and events are shown in Fig-
ure 4.1. When forecasts are perfect, P3 and P4 equal zero. But forecasts 
may be in error; predicted fl oods fail to materialize, and unpredicted 


















NOTE: Adopt short-run protection if  Cshort-run × (P2 + P4) + Loss × P3 < Loss × (P3 + P4).
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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fl oods occur. The situation can be visualized as one where sandbags 
can be added to the levee provided that suffi cient lead time is afforded. 
Whether such a forecast should be used hinges on the expected sum of 
costs and losses. It makes economic sense to adopt protection and use 
the forecast if the expected cost of sandbagging, C(P2 + P4), is less than 
the expected loss, L(P3 + P4).
The Value of Long-Term Protection
One might wonder whether there is a better way to deal with the 
hazard; a more permanent form of protection might be more effi cient. 
In this case fl ood forecasts are disregarded in favor of probabilities 
dictated by the climate. Here the cost of protection is certain and the 
expected loss is the probability of fl ooding times loss. Note that these 
losses and costs are likely to be different from those shown in Figure 
4.1, but the interplay of cost and loss is key to adopting protection none-
theless: that is, adopt long-run protection if Clong-run < L(P3 + P4).
A Simple but Powerful Way of Conceptualizing the
Hazard Problem
This highly simplistic framework provides some very useful in-
sights into the value of information. One is that it is not always wise 
to act on a forecast. Errors might be too costly, and doing nothing may 
be the most economical path. This point is easily demonstrated by ask-
ing what a hail forecast is worth to a wheat farmer. Since there are no 
technically feasible ways of protecting the crop from damage, it follows 
that the forecast would be worthless (perhaps less than worthless since 
the farmer would worry about the fate of the crop). The framework also 
raises the issue of perceptions versus objective measures. If the decision 
maker is ill equipped to assess the probabilities (as Howard Kunreuther 
has often pointed out) or does not take into account the full magnitude 
of losses and costs, then the choice observed will not be the optimal 
choice. Finally, the value of improving disaster forecasts is a dynamic 
metric: it hinges on how losses and cost change over time. This may 
seem a bit abstract, but consider that the current climate change debate 
revolves around escalating losses observed along the nation’s coastline. 
At fi rst blush, rising losses could be interpreted to mean that the prob-
cochrane.indd   69 5/25/2010   1:42:18 PM
70   Cochrane
abilities have shifted. However, it is just as likely that both the coastal 
population and the wealth at risk have risen over the past 50 years. The 
framework just presented allows for either or both. Roger Pielke Jr. 
(2005) performed a careful analysis of hurricane losses and concluded 
that rising losses are tied to population and wealth and not to increased 
frequency and severity. Although there is still a healthy debate about 
the issue (Emanuel 2005), the cost-loss framework has proven useful in 
pointing research in the right direction.
A Deeper Look at the Economics of Climate Change
The cost-loss model also lends itself to a deeper analysis of climate 
change. Although the problem still involves cost, loss, and the probabil-
ity of disaster, the interpretations are different. The cost of mitigating 
the effects of climate change is the reduction in economic growth re-
sulting from curtailing CO2 emissions. The economics of cap-and-trade 
are pretty clear: investments in cleaner-burning fuels and higher-cost 
renewables will ratchet growth downward. The cost to GDP is open to 
debate, but few will argue that the difference in growth paths is the cost 
of capping emissions. The loss incurred in the event of climatic warm-
ing is just as contentious. But much of the debate revolves around the 
magnitude of loss. There is considerable disagreement regarding the de-
gree to which the climate will change, and predictions of the economic 
impacts are therefore equally murky. Despite this, no one is arguing 
that climate change will be benign. If we assume for argument’s sake 
that climate change losses will be disastrous and that anthropogenic 
CO2 is in fact the chief culprit, a case can be made for controlling emis-
sions now. Assume that Panthropogenic is the current assessment regarding 
the likelihood that anthropogenic CO2 is the chief cause. Assume too 
that if emissions are curtailed now, future losses would be mitigated. 
On the other hand, if no action is taken to control atmospheric carbon, 
and CO2 is indeed the causal agent triggering a more varied climate, the 
decision to do nothing will be irreversible. In contrast, the decision to 
limit fossil fuel use now can be revisited once the results of climate re-
search become more defi nitive. This option is reversible if at some later 
date it is revealed that atmospheric carbon is the product of warming 
and not the other way around. In the economics literature the benefi t of 
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taking action now that may be revised later when updated information 
is available is referred to as quasioption value.
The factors underlying this decision are the same as those that 
shaped the use of climate and weather information in the previous cost-
loss example. Carbon control is worthwhile if the losses are suffi ciently 
high, the control costs low, and the a priori probabilistic assessment 
of the connection between CO2 and climate change is high. That is, 
the decision to curtail anthropogenic CO2 is optimal if Ccontrol/Ldisaster < 
Panthropogenic. Despite its simplicity, the framework provides a valuable 
guide for debating climate policy. First, a good case can be made for 
taking action now despite the uncertainties regarding the causal mecha-
nism. Waiting until these uncertainties are resolved could be the least 
appealing option. The decision to act now hinges on the cost, the losses, 
and the current state of knowledge regarding the direction of the causal 
arrow—that is, the probability that the arrow representing causation 
points from anthropogenic CO2 to climate (i.e., anthropogenic CO2 is 
causing climate change) rather than from climate to CO2. Second, the 
framework properly draws attention to the role of anthropogenic CO2 
rather than to warming itself.
PROSPECTIVE VIEW OF LOSSES
It is clear from the preceding retrospective that losses (either ob-
jectively measured or perceived by the decision maker) are crucial to 
managing natural hazards. However, what constitutes a loss and how 
losses should be measured remain murky. Before we look at losses in 
more detail, it is worth taking a moment to refl ect on the possibility that 
the market may have already discounted for locational risk. In other 
words, the price of housing might already accommodate the location 
of the property in an area subject to some hazard. If it does, then there 
is no reason to proceed any further. There has been some debate about 
this, but in my opinion it is highly unlikely that prospective buyers are 
well informed about risks of any sort. Howard Kunreuther has spent the 
better part of his career arguing that decision makers make poor choices 
because they use simple heuristics. In some cases they totally ignore 
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low-probability events, and in others they overstate the likelihood of 
high-consequence events. The market for housing (and willingness to 
pay) refl ects this. However, if market prices refl ect considerable ig-
norance and misinformation, it is unwise to utilize them to formulate 
policy. The recent housing market collapse serves to illustrate this point 
quite nicely. Despite what orthodox economists claim for the market, 
I believe, at least for natural hazards, that housing prices provide little 
useful information regarding willingness to pay for safety. Loss stud-
ies are so important precisely because markets provide such unreliable 
information.
So, what losses are we talking about and how should they be 
measured? As will be discussed shortly, loss consists of the obvious 
(damage to buildings, contents, infrastructure, as well as loss of life) 
and the not-so-obvious (loss of cultural icons, historic monuments, a 
sense of place, and the indirect economic dislocations stemming from 
damage). Table 4.1 provides a simple list. I will address each briefl y and 
then move on to regional and national economic impacts, which I will 
address in more detail.
Property Losses and Deaths
There is a substantial body of work tying wind velocity, ground 
shaking, and fl ood depth to property damage and subsequent loss of 
life. Although empirically estimated damage functions contain a sub-
stantial error band, they seem to work fairly well, particularly when 
damages are aggregated over a wide area. The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency’s HAZUS program (Hazards United States), a so-
phisticated geographic information system, incorporates such functions 
for a variety of building types and hazards. In my view, property loss 
is the least problematic of all the losses. Similarly, there appears to be 
an empirically verifi able linkage between fatalities and the number of 
structures destroyed, at least for sudden-onset events such as tornadoes 
and earthquakes. Thus damage and fatality seem reasonably predict-
able through available means. The same cannot be said about the other 
categories of loss I am addressing, including value of life.
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The value of a life
Although deaths are predictable, the value attached to each death 
remains an elusive concept. I realize that this is a highly contentious 
topic fraught with technical and ethical complexities. Having said that, 
I want to raise a few issues. Most important, disaster mortality and 
morbidity models account for statistical lives lost, not identifi ed lives. 
No one worries about insurance companies that project loss of life and 
attempt to quantify those losses. An identifi ed life is something quite 
different, however. No one would or should attempt to assess the value 
of an identifi ed life. Second, if we are unwilling to attach a value to 
these so-called statistical deaths, then we might fi nesse the question 
by determining how much it costs to preserve a life through protective 
measures such as land use regulation and improved building codes. It 
is then up to the public to determine whether the costs are worth it. The 
benefi ts of hazard mitigation would have to be weighed against other 
life-saving options (e.g., dialysis, wellness programs). Although the 
problems inherent in estimating and valuing loss of life are formidable, 
they are relatively manageable.
Loss of cultural icons and historic monuments
While a solid foundation exists for the debate over mortality and 
direct damage to property, the state of knowledge regarding the other 
losses shown in Table 4.1 pales in comparison. Value is inherent in cul-
tural icons, historic monuments, and a sense of place. Hurricane Katrina 
did more than destroy the city of New Orleans. The nation lost a cul-
tural heritage that was rich in diversity and steeped in history. Much that 
has been written about post-Katrina New Orleans bemoans the changes 
wrought by the storm. The losses suffered go beyond the number of 
Table 4.1  An Analysis of Losses
Mortality, morbidity, along with property damage are the best known.
Loss of environmental services, cultural icons, historic monuments, and a 
sense of place are less well known and understood.
Systemic risk and loss of regional economic activity are also not well under-
stood.
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deaths and the damage to buildings inundated because of breached 
levees, and even beyond New Orleans itself to affect the nation as a 
whole. Despite the growing body of literature attempting to establish 
values for nonmarket losses, measurement of iconic value remains a 
problem. Icons and monuments have market values that are readily 
measurable through surveys and travel-cost methods. However, such 
techniques don’t reveal their existence value. Research on this rich and 
intriguing subject is still in its infancy.
Systemic and indirect losses
Systemic and indirect losses are also not well understood. The 
current fi nancial panic has served to rivet attention on just how large 
contagion effects and their associated indirect impacts can be. Fur-
thermore, the current economic meltdown underscores an important 
point. That is, the loss anticipated by any one participant can turn out 
to be vastly different when interindustry linkages and uncertainty are 
considered. Or, as Gary Becker said in addressing the 2008 fi nancial 
meltdown, “While fi nancial specialists understand how individual as-
sets function, even they have limited understanding of the aggregate 
risks created by the system” (Becker 2008).
This observation bears directly on the cost-loss framework devel-
oped earlier, and on willingness to pay for protection. The events of late 
2008 and early 2009 have underscored the point that an individual’s 
perceptions are often at odds with systemwide risks. Given this dis-
crepancy, it seems again unwise to rely on market forces to suggest a 
meaningful measure of willingness to pay for safety. I will spend the 
remainder of the paper on this topic, emphasizing the likely economic 
consequences of disaster, how to measure them (including why com-
monly utilized techniques fail), and why the results of some disasters 
differ signifi cantly from those of others.
Alternative Ways of Modeling the Regional Economic
Response to Shocks
There is currently no clear consensus as to how supply shocks can 
be successfully modeled. Input-output models have been tried, as have 
a wide range of alternatives, including computable general equilibrium 
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models, econometric models, and even postevent surveys. They all 
leave something to be desired. A lot of what I will be discussing relies 
on a basic understanding of input-output models. A brief discussion of 
input-output basics is provided in Appendix 4A for those unfamiliar 
with the technique and its terminology.
Input-output models were designed to explain how fi nal demand 
changes ripple throughout a region’s (or nation’s) interconnected sec-
tors. The linkages are rather straightforward. An increase or decrease 
in demand for one sector’s production indirectly boosts or reduces de-
mand for ingredients supplied by other sectors. As a result, a one-dollar 
change in demand leads to more than one dollar’s change in production 
when all intermediate transactions are accounted for. Input-output mod-
els have one fatal limitation: they are incapable of addressing the types 
of bottlenecks commonly observed after disaster. These models have no 
way of accounting for the possibility that supplying sectors may lack 
the capacity to provide needed inputs (leading to forward-linked losses) 
or, conversely, that producing sectors may lack the capacity to absorb 
all that their suppliers wish to ship (causing backward-linked losses).
Since the input-output technique implicitly assumes that there are 
no limits to production, it is incapable of treating the uneven set of 
supply constraints typically observed after disaster. It would be purely 
coincidental if the pattern of economic disruption emerging after a 
natural disaster matched the pre-event production pattern. Therefore, 
altering fi nal demands to fi t postdisaster production patterns would be 
problematic.
The other techniques just mentioned also have limitations. Com-
putable general equilibrium models (CGEs) are an elaborate form of 
input-output, with an interindustry table at the core. CGEs permit fi -
nal demand substitutions as shortages materialize. Unfortunately, the 
estimates of substitution elasticities embedded in the CGEs are prob-
lematic at best, particularly for unique events such as natural disasters. 
Furthermore, in some cases where a public utility is impacted (such as 
a water treatment or supply system), there is no meaningful measure of 
substitutability. CGEs are less useful for that type of loss estimation.
Finally, a shortcoming of both econometric models (particularly 
time series) and postdisaster surveys is that they are calibrated using a 
set of unique events. Time series techniques, like event analysis, look 
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at the difference between trends with and without a disaster. Although 
appealing on the surface, event analysis is applied to an event. Since it 
is an event, it refl ects only the characteristics of that event: the disas-
ter relief policies in place, the pattern of destruction, the nature of the 
economy, and so on. Therefore, it is diffi cult to generalize from such 
an analysis to other potential events. Because of this limitation, event 
analysis may be useful for forensic studies, but not for policy analysis. 
A similar criticism applies to postevent surveys. What can one say be-
yond what the survey indicates about the loss sustained by a particular 
place, given that it was struck by a particular event at a time when a 
particular set of disaster relief policies applied? Very little.
An Algorithm for Analyzing Supply Shocks
An algorithm was developed at Colorado State University to ad-
dress the shortcomings of the approaches just discussed. As in the case 
of CGE, the algorithm takes a region’s interindustry linkages as its core. 
It then allows for excess capacity in each sector as a function of the 
region’s rate of unemployment. Furthermore, the algorithm augments 
internal production with the aid of imports from other regions. Finally, 
it allows for the stimulative effects of reconstruction spending and the 
fi scal drag caused by indebtedness. The algorithm then seeks out the 
best outcome (in terms of regional income) that rebalances the economy. 
The economy is rebalanced when all excess supplies or demands are 
eliminated. See Figure 4.2 for a schematic of the rebalancing process.
A simple numerical illustration
I’ll use the example input-output table provided in Appendix 4A to 
analyze a few simple economic shocks. In the simplest shock each sec-
tor suffers a proportionate reduction in output. If a disaster eliminates 
50 percent of both sectors’ capacity, then output in sectors S1 and S2 
would be limited to 50 and 75, respectively. The outcome of such a 
constraint is self-evident. Eventually, shipments to each of the sectors 
will shrink, as will income to households. They all decline by 50 per-
cent. Household spending for each of the two sectors’ products will also 
shrink by 50 percent. Exports are assumed to shrink proportionately 
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as well. The fi nal result is self-evident: the economy will shrink by 50 
percent.
This is of course the simplest of cases. Things get a bit more compli-
cated when the pattern of production is limited in some disproportionate 
way and reconstruction spending amplifi es the effects of bottlenecks. In 
addition, shortages can be avoided through imports or utilizing excess 
capacity of the region’s factories. These are but a few of the options 
contained in the algorithm.
One last note: the economy can rebalance at many levels. Even in 
the previous example, balance could have been achieved at 25 percent 
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of predisaster production or even at zero. It is important, therefore, that 
rebalancing occur in light of some objective. The one that makes the 
most sense is to rebalance in a way that maximizes the region’s post-
event income. However, a result that maximizes regional income may 
not be the one produced by market forces. Since I have called CGE into 
question (due to unreliable estimates of substitution elasticities, among 
other problems), I will defend the algorithm’s result as the best feasible 
outcome. This at least provides an envelope of outcomes that policy-
makers can use to compare different hazards or mitigation strategies.
A few additional notes about the algorithm
The CSU algorithm is based on a 20-sector interindustry table, 
while rebalancing is achieved by an iterative procedure where sectoral 
outputs are adjusted within the confi nes of postevent constraints and 
capacities. Adjustments proceed until the algorithm fi nds that all other 
feasible adjustment patterns yield an inferior level of regional income. 
The process is repeated each month throughout the period of recovery, 
yielding a measure of how much the region’s income is impacted. Fi-
nally, the algorithm tracks shifts in interregional trade as rebalancing 
alters the region’s import-export mix. In addition, it accounts for fi nan-
cial liabilities incurred both nationally and regionally. Liabilities are 
amortized and household demand is adjusted accordingly. The entire 
process is complex but has been tested and proved to yield reasonable 
results. A full discussion of the process is beyond the scope of the chap-
ter, but the outlines of a typical result provide some useful insights into 
how a stricken economy is likely to rebound.
A Prototypical Pattern of Economic Recovery
Figure 4.3 shows what is typically observed after a disaster. Initial-
ly there is some disruption of income fl ows and a decline in spending. 
Then, as reconstruction begins and damaged sectors are restored, the 
economy rebounds until gains are observed. In most instances the re-
building stimulus produces an economic boom exceeding the predisaster 
level of activity. Eventually recovery is complete and reconstruction 
spending dries up. If reconstruction is fi nanced externally (via insur-
ance or federal aid), regional income can be expected to subside to the 
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pre-event level. If, however, the region is forced to draw upon savings 
or borrow, the added debt burden acts as a drag on future income, since 
households and local government are forced to offset the debt by cur-
tailing spending. Total loss is simply the discounted sum of the stream 
of losses and gains, as shown in Figure 4.3.
The national pattern looks similar. Disruption ripples to surround-
ing regions via shifts in imports and exports, the use of extraregional 
construction talent, and the liabilities incurred nationally.
Hurricane Katrina: An Illustration of How the Model Works
Direct damage to the Gulf region as a result of Hurricane Katrina 
has been estimated at around $200 billion (give or take $50 billion). 
This seemingly fuzzy estimate is in fact rather precise given that re-
gional and national economic losses have yet to be tabulated. I took 
this opportunity to exercise the algorithm in order to come up with an 
Figure 4.3  Prototypical Regional Loss Pattern
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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estimate of what Katrina cost New Orleans Parish and the country as 
a whole. As expected, parish income fell sharply after the storm. Dis-
ruptions to tourism, oil and gas operations, and barge traffi c rippled 
throughout the region. This decline was partially offset by an immedi-
ate injection of spending for relief and recovery. At the same time that 
New Orleans proper was in a state of collapse, two confl icting forces 
that impacted the economies of neighboring regions were set in motion. 
First, the New Orleans economy was so damaged that some of the relief 
and reconstruction stimulus leaked to surrounding economies. That is to 
say, outside construction talent and other related imports were brought 
into the city to supplement what survived the storm. Economies outside 
New Orleans benefi ted as a result. Second, as the New Orleans econ-
omy shrank, normal imports into the region declined as well. Figure 
4.4 shows the results of the CSU simulation. The upper line shows the 
recovery path for New Orleans proper, while the lower line provides an 
estimate of the total loss to both New Orleans and the rest of the nation.
Figure 4.4  Economic Loss Inside and Outside New Orleans (Delayed 
Reconstruction)
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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One might ask why the New Orleans economy suffered so much. 
To help answer this question, the economic repercussions of Hurricane 
Andrew on Miami–Dade County were calculated using the algorithm. 
Figure 4.5 shows the results. In contrast to Katrina, Andrew produced 
little long-term impact, a difference attributable to four factors. First, 
Katrina caused about fi ve times the damage. That alone would explain 
much of the difference. Second, the New Orleans economy is signifi -
cantly smaller than the Miami-Dade economy, which could cope with 
bottlenecks by drawing upon a larger internal excess capacity. Third, 
since Andrew’s winds were the primary cause of damage, property in-
surance covered most of the loss. Because normal homeowners policies 
exclude fl ooding, little of the fl ood loss (the primary source of dam-
age from Katrina) was insured. Finally, New Orleans faced a housing 
shortage, so it was diffi cult to attract outside reconstruction talent. Fur-
thermore, the city became embroiled in a contentious debate concerning 
Figure 4.5  The Economic Impact of Katrina Contrasted with Andrew
SOURCE: Author’s calculations.
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how to deal with the ongoing fl ood hazard. The resulting reconstruction 
delays still limit the amount of rebuilding that has occurred.
FINAL REMARKS
This chapter has been divided into retrospective and prospective 
parts. The fi rst part emphasized a few key ideas that, with the aid of 
hindsight, seem to be logical extensions of water resources economics 
and the economics of information. Having said that, I am struck by the 
power of these ideas. I believe that even the simplest of cost-loss mod-
els offers valuable insights that are too often lost on policymakers. The 
confused debate over climate change policy serves to buttress my point. 
The most puzzling aspect of the literature of the 1960s and 1970s is that 
so little effort was devoted to categorizing and measuring losses, despite 
the fact that cost-loss models are worthless without a reasonable loss as-
sessment. Much of this early work was devoted to conceptualizing the 
problem, where loss was supposed to be self-evident. The second part 
of the chapter, the prospective view, suggested several topics that need 
additional attention. Finally, I took a controversial position regarding 
the use of survey techniques, time series analysis, and CGE. I hold that 
these methodologies have limited value for predicting how regions are 
likely to be impacted by unique events. More important, the economic 
climate has shifted drastically from the time when generous federal aid 
was available and little excess housing capacity existed. It is dangerous 
to rely on models that were calibrated using economic conditions that 
may no longer apply.
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Appendix 4A
A Primer on Interindustry Analysis
Input-output tables are the foundation of regional economics. As the name 
implies, an input-output table traces the fl ow of products from industry to in-
dustry and from industry to households, to government, and for export. It also 
traces the ingredients inherent in an industry’s production (it is, in effect, a 
recipe). Operational tables can contain as few as 10 sectors or as many as 360. 
Table 4A.1 shows a simple two-sector table.
The columns represent the shipment of goods from industry to industry, to 
households, and as exports. The right-hand summation is the total shipped (in 
the case of each industry), the total income earned (in the case of households) 
and the total amount imported into the region (in the case of imports). The 
units shown are typically measured in dollars. So, using the row of the fi rst 
sector, S1, to illustrate, $20 billion is shipped from the fi rst sector to itself: 
for example, oil may be used to produce more oil. An additional $45 billion 
worth is shipped to the second sector, $30 billion to households, and $5 billion 
exported from the region. The total amount shipped from S1 is therefore $100 
billion. The numbers in the fi rst column are interpreted differently. Sector 1’s 
total output is $100 billion (the bottom of column 1). Of this total, Sector 1 
contributes $20 billion and Sector 2 contributes $40 billion. Household income 
in the form of payments for labor and investments amount to another $20 bil-
lion of the total, and fi nally imports of $20 billion from elsewhere make up 
the remaining part of the total. The shaded area is referred to as interindustry 
demands. Note that gross shipments must equal supply (gross product) for the 
economy to be in balance.
Any shock to this economy will begin with a restriction in supply, which 
then sets a number of adjustments in motion. Declining production means 
lower income for workers, which reduces household demand for consumer 
items. Declining production also results in bottlenecks in the production of 
other interrelated industries. Such restrictions feed back to the sector suffering 
the initial shock. Although somewhat simple to describe, an operational model 
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Table 4A.1  Example, Input-Output Table: A Typical Interindustry Table
S1 S2 Households Exports
Gross
shipments
S1 20 45 30 5 100
S2 40 15 30 65 150
Households 20 60 0 0 80
Imports 20 30 20 0 70
Gross product 100 150 80 70 400
NOTE: S1 = industry sector 1; S2 = industry sector 2.
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